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SHOULD THE GRAND JURY SYSTEM BE
ABOLISHED ?*
The traditions of the common law, like the traditions of creed,
resent change and innovation.
A system for the ascertainment of the commission of crime and
the detection of the criminal, begun several centuries ago, and
afterward evolved into an instrument of reasonable usefulness and
protection, forcefully appeals to the prejudices of conservatism. But
it is a maxim of the law, rarely admitting an exception, that when the
reason for the law ceases so does the law. Has not the reason for
the law ceased in America?
In order to reach a just and fair conclusion it is necessary
to inquire, at least briefly, into the. origin of the inquisitorial pro-
cess, and the conditions surrounding its adoption. There is some
reason to support the contention sometimes asserted, that the
institution existed among the Saxons. (Crabb. Eng. Laws 35.)
However, not until the reign of Henry II does the statute
law provide for a jury for the investigation of supposed crimes.
(Statute of Clarendon, io Hen. II, A. D. 1164.)
It was then provided "if such men were suspected whohm none
wished or dared to accuse, the sheriff being thereto required by
the bishop, should swear twelve men of the neighborhood or village
to declare the truth respecting such supposed crime," the jurors
being summoned as witnesses or accusers, rather than as judges. It
is generally conceded that the grand jury system was either created
or reorganized by this statute. (Spence Eq. Jur., 63.)
Adverting to the relation of the old Frankish inquest to the
initiation of criminal proceedings by indictment, a later authority
refers to the accusing jury of Henry II thus: "The ancestors of
our grand jurors are from the first neither accusers nor exactly
witnesses; they are to give voice to the common repute." (2 Poll.
& Mait., 639.)
In the very beginning it is apparent that the system emanated
from fear of royal influence and was designed to stand as a barrier,
* This paper was delivered before the New York State Bar Association
on January 6, 19o6.
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protecting the accused from the baseless and malicious charges of
the accuser. Criminal proceedings were then merely private af-
fairs.
Judges and magistrates were royal favorites. Tenure of office
rested entirely with the pleasure of the Crown. The rights of per-
son were loosely regarded and more than ordinary courage was re-
quired to bring accusation against those who enjoyed royal pro-
tection. It had become practically impossible to secure a crim-
inal's punishment unless the criminal happened to be of the class
whose welfare and existence offered no special concern to those
in power.
There was, indeed, a necessity for the existence of some
tribunal where the common people might be heard, without fear
of punishment for telling the truth. But even then the protection
sought by the people seems to have been very imperfect and in-
complete. It was during the reign of Henry VIII that the grand
jury system was boastfully proclaimed to be the guardian of "the
people's liberties" and "the bulwark of freedom," and yet 72,000
persons suffered death by hanging during this reign, in most cases
for trivial offenses. Contemporaneous with the birth of the grand
jury, a subject of Great Britain might bring his wife into the public
market place, with a halter around her neck, to offer her for sale,
and the husband might chastise the wife for the discipline of the
whole family.
But there exists a vast difference between a theoretical rela-
tion of the grand jury to the ignorant and down trodden English
subjects over three centuries ago and its relation to the free and
enlightened citizenship of the United States of America in the
twentieth century. The relief sought by the yeomen was in a pop-
ular system in which they should be both heard and represented
as against every other judicial tribunal dominated by the Crown.
Every branch of our government is of the people. We require
no shield to protect the individual from the State's aggressions,
and witnesses to the truth need no longer feel the displeasure of
constituted authority. To maintain that the process of inquisition
is of great service at the present time is to concede that under our
republican form of government the liberties of the individual are
subject to the same baneful influences as existed under a despotism
in the dark ages.
What, then, are the specific charges against the grand jury
system?
At the beginning of the eighteenth century some of the very
ablest minds in England began to appreciate the grievous iniquities
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of the inquisitorial process, and Jeremy Bentham, as early as 1825,
speaking of the incongruities of the English Penal Procedure,
marshalled the following specifications of impeachment: "The
operations before this intermediate tribunal may be set down as
purely mischievous. They once had an object, but that object has
been done away. The object was to preserve an innocent man
from the operation incidental to prosecution, and innocent, he
might well be pronounced if even upon the face of the evidence
produced against him by the adversary, delinquency did not ap-
pear probable. The design was laudable, and to this design the
procedure, whatsoever might be the inconveniences attached to
it in other respects, was naturally enough adapted.
i. Evidence was received only on one side, on the side of the
prosecutor, on the side of the defendant not, for to call upon him
for his evidence would be to subject him to the very vexation
from which it was intended he should be prevented.
2. The -evidence was received and collected in secret; that
is to say, in so far as secrecy was compatible with the presence
and participation of a number of persons from twelve to twenty-
three. In the same intention these jurymen were sworn to secrecy.
Why? Because at this time the defendant knew nothing of the
matter. The bill being found by this jury thereupon there went
an order of arrestation. Had it not been for the oath, a friendly
juryman might give intimation and the defendant make his escape.
In the first place, the institution is useless; it has been so about
these twenty-five years. The defendant has already been subjected
to the vexation from Which he was thus to have been preserved.
From the middle of the sixteenth century examinations, as above
described, have taken place (i. e., the examinations before a
Justice).
In the next place, it is mischievous; it is so in no small degree.
One of the great boasts, as well as one of the greatest merits, of
English procedure, is its publicity. This security, it has been seen,
is sacrificed; sacrificed and so continues to be after the object for
which the sacrificewasmade is gone. The consequence is an unlimited
domination to popular prejudice; to party, if not personal interest
and affection; to false humanity; to caprice under all its inscrut-
able modifications." (Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Book 3,
chap. 15.)
After a lapse of nearly a century of time the evils enumer-
ated and inveighed against by Bentham, not only exist with us,
but have grown to more harmful proportions.
The first, and probably the paramount objection lies in the
,so.•
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fact that a free man may be held to answer for a felony, as a sus-
pect, in secret proceedings. He may never know that he is under
suspicion until apprehended as a criminal after indictment. The
evidence on which the indictment is based is presented to the jur-
ors without notice to the party against whom the accusation is
made. The ex parte statements of witnesses, who may be inflt-
enced by malice and revenge, are sufficient to brand the most in-
nocent citizen with the foulest crime. And the accused is unheard!
He may not even appear before the tribunal to explain or to con-
tradict the testimony offered against him, and the accusing witness-
es are not subjected to cross-examination.
No man should be held to answer for a crime without a hear-
ing and without an opportunity to meet his accusers face to face.
In a civilized society a person charged with infraction of the law
should at least be informed by whom the charge is made.
It is our peculiar distinction that in New York State we have
maintained, in the very essence, the most vicious provisions of the
grand jury system. Conforming generally to the rules of the
common law, we have embodied in statute form the following
direction:
"The grand jury ought to find an indictment when all the
evidence before them, taken together, is such as in their judgment
would, if unexplained and uncontradicted, warrant a conviction
by the trial jury." (Code Crim. Proc., sec. 258.) In effect, there-
fore, the indictment is the opinion of at least twelve men that the
accused is probably guilty. An indictment must be found if the
evidence is such that if "unexplained" and "uncontradicted," a
conviction would be justified. And the accused is prohibited from
presenting any evidence whatever that might contribute to the very
explanation and the contradiction which might lead the investi-
gating body to. a different conclusion.
It is certainly unjust that there should exist any sort of a
presumption that the accused is guilty before trial.. But this is
practically the result of every indictment. At the threshold of
trial the prisoner is confronted with the solemn edict of one jury
of his peers that there is evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction.
Instead of a presumption of innocence until proved guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, a legal tribunal has already delivered an opin-
ion and created the presumption that the accused is a criminal.
Surprising as may be the declaration, it has been confirmed
by experience that a very large proportion of trial jurors indulge
the belief that the prisoner would not be arraigned under an in-
dictment if he were entirely innocent. Upon the trial the accused
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must meet, therefore, not only the people's evidence, but the subtle
and dangerous influence carried with the indictment, found as a re-
sult of proceedings to which the accused could not be a party. It
is true that some degree of suspicion will exist in every case,
whether the accused is held under an indictment or by order of a
committing magistrate. But experience has justified the conclu-
sion that trial jurors are not nearly so likely to assume that some
truth exists in the charge against the prisoner, when the latter is
held by a magistrate, as where at least twelve men, constituting
a prior jury, have believed the charge to have been well founded on
the evidence. It is the judgment of those who have made special
study of the existing procedure that trial jurors will be strongly
influenced by an opinion rendered by their fellow-neighbors on a
question of fact presented before them, while they will regard
with indifference the findings of a magistrate whose judgment may
be based upon the technicalities of the law, as well as upon the facts.
Furthermore, even if the opinion of a magistrate must necessarily
create some suspicion as to the probable guilt of the offender, it
must be remembered that the court's conclusion. has been
reached, not upon ex parte testimony alone, without cross-examin-
ation, but after the person charged has been given every oppor-
tunity to refute the accusations made against him.
A further serious objection is that the inquisition is frequently
made the instrument of extortion. The experience of England
and America has been the same in this respect. It is quite im-
material whether the suspected person be guilty or innocent. If
innocent, his fears are worked upon. He dreads the public dis-
grace of the charge, however unfounded it may be. It
means, at least, a blight to his own hopes and the humiliation of
his family. A final vindication by a trial court may be an as-
sured fact, still there must be the dreaded publicity, unless the
prosecution can be stopped. Such a result may be effected with
much less difficulty, because there has been no public hearing. No
magistrate has listened to the evidence and the proceedings of the
grand jury room are secret and sacred.
If the party be guilty, there is still a deeper motive for com-
promise. The innocent man may hope for an acquittal, but the
guilty anticipates and fears conviction. All the influence of
friends and of money is brought to bear in order to obstruct or to
frustrate justice. Political power is too often used to the same
end. And the reason all this is possible is because the inquisitor-
ial proceedings are one-sided and secret and the accused and ac-
cuser may not meet. There no longer exists a single legitimate
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reason why proceedings in any part of our judicial system should
be secret, except in examinations or trials, where the testimony to
be adduced is of such a nature that good morals and public policy
are not best served by publicity. "Every movement should be
towards publicity," said Bentham, "of the procedure before the
trial jury, a characteristic and indispensable property is publicity;
of the proceedings before the grand juries, a -property still more
characteristic is secrecy."
One of the earliest arguments in favor of secrecy in the in-
quisition was that the accused parties might not escape before
legal apprehension. But this reason has long since disappeared.
Time was when transportation and communication were so slow,
difficult and incomplete that a criminal was afforded every facility
for escape. With the telegraph and railroads and treaties of
extradition with all civilized peoples there is very little possibility
that the guilty may be secure in flight, although under any condi-
tions he may delay capture.
The secrecy of the grand jury room is as unfair and un-
American as its ex parte characteristic. Particularly at a time
in our political development when the greatest publicity is de-
manded to insure the people's rights, it is important that every
branch of our executive, administrative and judicial systems should
be open to public observation and investigation.
Fatal as are these objections to procedure by indictment, the
arraignment does not stop here. Other evils, if not, perhaps, so
serious, still exceedingly vicious and harmful, contribute additional
evidence in condemnation of the existing law.
It very frequently occurs that a grand jury fails to return an
indictment, although the accused may be subjected to the greatest
public criticism. Of course, a "true bill" should not be found,
unless on sufficient legal evidence, but, nevertheless, this procedure
places the alleged offender in a most cruel predicament. He has
escaped the charge because the grand jury has intervened. Grave
suspicion may still rest upon him, for the reason that it may never
be known by what means or instrumentality the proof failed to,
satisfy the accusers. In its effect libel may be no less a libel be-
cause it is made under cover of the law. The man lives forever
a suspect, without the privilege even of a fair explanation. When-
ever it is believed that sufficient evidence exists to warrant an ar-
rest for crime, the party against whom the charge is made should,
at least, be accorded an opportunity for public vindication. Voic-
ing the sentiments of all honorable men, Sir Nicholas Throck-
morton, after an acquittal of high treason, declared: "It is better
to be tried than live suspected."
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Furthermore, whenever a crime is committed it is essential
that the perpetrators of the crime be apprehended with the least
possible delay. The grand jury system, instead of preventing,
makes possible the felon's escape. In practice, it is quite usual
that many weeks intervene between the time of the commission
of the crime, and the convening of the grand jury. In nearly
every instance where a preliminary hearing has not been held be-
fore a magistrate, the accused is granted sufficient opportunity to
elude the process of the court.
While the common-law privilege of presentment, in the nature
of information upon which an indictment may be framed, has
never been suffitiently observed in this country to have established
a general American practice, still there inheres to the system the
right "to make a sort of general presentment of evil things to call
public attention to them, yet not an instruction for any specific
indictment. No one could be called to answer such a present
ment." (Bish. Cr. Pro., 4th ed., sec. 137, subd. 2.)
Under protection of this arbitrary power, the acts of pub-
lic officers and of public bodies may be criticised and condemned,
and it matters not whether there be a reasonable excuse for such
action or whether the motive is malice, revenge or partisan advan-
tage. In this manner, the basest reflections may be cast upon the
most innocent character, and the person who is held up to public cen-
sure and contempt is left practically without redress.
The exercise of this prerogative by the grand jury led the
court, in the matter of Gardiner (31 Misc., 367), to declare:
"While it may be observed that the court has tolerated rather than
sanctioned such presentments, of things general, yet the grand
jury should never, under cover of a presentment, present an individ-
ual in this manner, for if it have legal evidence of the commission
of the crime, it should find indictment against him upon which he
could be held to answer, and if it have no such evidence it might
in fairness be silent." What, then, is there to be said in defense
of a system to which statute law permits slich irresponsible power
and such arbitrary discretion?
The grand jury may not only find or decline to find an indict-
ment upon the ex parte evidence presented, but it may go still
further and of its own motion, with little knowledge, or no knowl-
edge of existing facts and conditions, make such charges which,
if true, should be made the basis of a criminal prosecution, to
which the alleged offender should be given the privilege to answer.
It must also be taken into account that the expense of an in-
termediate tribunal amounts, in the aggregate, to a very large sum,
to be met by taxation.
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Admitting that all these imperfections exist, it is asked, if we
do away with the present system, what procedure can be estab-
lished more just, and better adapted to our requirenlents? They
who would seek in this state a better method than proceedings by
indictment are not beginners in an untried field. The undertak-
ing here will not be the commencement of the assault. The
sanctity of tradition and the veneration of ancient rights have not
so blinded the people of our sister states that they have failed to
observe and to remove certain legal obstructions that lie in the
path of the administration of justice.
In nearly one fourth of the United States of America the
common-law grand jury has either been entirely abrogated or so
modified and restricted in its sphere as to more closely conform
to present-day needs. In Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Colorado, the state constitution gives the legis-
lature authority to make laws dispensing with grand juries in any
case. The legislature of Nebraska may provide for holding per-
sons to answer for all criminal offenses on the information of a
public prosecutor. Alabama and Michigan each permit other pro-
cess in criminal cases.
Constitutional provisions permitting all criminal proceedings
to be made by information, or dispensing with grand juries in cer-
tain cases further exist in the Federal government and in the fol-
lowing states: California Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Mon-
tana, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming.*
Referring to trial by jury, before the American Bar Associa-
tion, in August, I9O5, Mr. Justice Brown, of the United States
Supreme Court, briefly alluded to the rapidly growing sentiment
against the grand jury system and to the wisdom of the changes
adopted in the several states. "The assumption of criminal pro-
ceedings by the State," says Mr. Justice Brown, "and the appoint-
ment of attorneys charged with the duty of prosecuting only those
who were held for bail by any examining magistrate upon proof
of probable cause, has been found in practice to afford ample pro-
tection to the accused. Indeed, as the accused may introduce
evidence before the magistrate to disprove the existence of prob-
able cause, he is even better protected than he is by a grand jury,
*See Hurtado v. Peofile, xio U. S. S16; Kalloch v. Suf. Ct.. 56 Cal.
229; In re Lowrie, 8 Col. 499; Romero v. State, 60 Conn. 92; State v. Boss-
well, 104 Ind. 45 1; State v. Barnett, 3 Kan. 250; State v. Woods, 3r La. An.
267; State v. Brett, x6 Mont. 36o; Mfiller v. State, 29 Neb. 437; State v.
Ayers, 85 So. Dak. 517; Aratter of Maxwell, xg Utah 495; State V. Dyer, 67
Vt. 69o; Rowan v. State, 104 Ind. 54i; State v. Boulter, 5 Wy. 236.
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which listens only to evidence of his guilt, given in secret and with
no opportunity of explanation."
For more than eighty years felonies have been prosecuted in
the State of Connecticut by information, and in Michigan for more
than fifty years. During a long service on the federal bench, Mr.
Justice Brown was afforded every facility for observation of the
new system, and he declares that in all his experience, he has yet
to find a lawyer who advocated a return to the old process. And
this is not strange, for the Michigan system is sensible, fair and
equitable.
Under this procedure, before an indictment can be had, an
open examination must be conducted where all the witnesses
can be tested by counsel or confronted by the accused, and where
all the proceedings are under the rules of law and where only legal
evidence is admissible. The witnesses are likely to be truthful, as
they sign depositions and their statements are at once exposed to
full investigation. In the event of death, absence or insanity, the
state may use their deposition.
A reasotnable provision of the Michigan law permits the court,
in its discretion, to summon a grand jury, where the inquisitorial
character has been found efficient in the unearthing of frauds
and the abatement of nuisances.
There can be no just objection to a system in this state which
would permit the prosecution of all felonies by information and
which would still allow the court, if public necessity seemed to
require, to summon a grand jury for purposes of inquisition. It
is quite generally admitted, even by those who do not favor abro-
gation of the grand jury system, that its chief efficiency now ex-
ists only in special instances, relating to matters of public con-
cern. Permit the court, then, in its discretion, to determine when
that need exists, and in all other cases let the preliminary proceed-
ings be held before an examining magistrate alone. While it is
maintained that results have uniformly and clearly demonstrated
the great superiority of the method of prosecuting felonies without
the intervention of a lay tribunal, still the-retention of the inquisi-
torial process to be used in the discretion of the court, would
serve to allay the fears of those who seem strongly inclined to be-
lieve that an examining magistrate would be less fearless and
less independent in cases requiring the investigation of wrongs,
arising from political corruption or malfeasance, than a body of
laymen set apart. It is certainly manifest that the responsibilities
of a magistrate will be greatly increased by the abrogation of the
intermediate tribunal. In those states where prisoners are bound
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over to the grand jury, it is the consensus of opinion, as expressed
by the closest observers, that the magistrate feels a lesser degree
of responsibility and is inclined to hold prisoners on less con-
vincing evidence than is possible in those jurisdictions where pro-
ceedings by indictment follow the commitment. And, on the other
hand, the grand jurors less appreciate the gravity of their under-
taking, in cases which have already been passed upon by a magis-
trate. So that the magistrate is apt to be negligent, relying on
the grand jury for a further investigation, and knowing that the
onus of an indictment rests alone with that body, and the grdnd
jurors, in turn, shift the burden and are less concerned because
a judicial officer has already directed the accused to be held under
the charge. Therefore, the interests of the people and the individ-
ual cannot be conserved by the existence of these two tribunals,
side by side. But the magistrate, who is accountable directly to
the people, with no intervention between himself and the trial
court, is sure to feel the importance of his duties and the necessity
that his judicial acts shall conform to the law and to the facts.
It has been successfully demonstrated, wherever the attempt
has been made, that the prosecution of all crimes may safely be
instituted before an examining court, and that the presentment
and indictment of the grand jury are no longer necessary either
to a prompt or to a certain and safe administration of justice.
Cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex.
George Lawyer
